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Abstract  
Is public support for redistribution affected by the number of people experiencing economic 
strain in a country? This question is investigated by comparing 28 countries in the fourth 
round of the European Social Survey 2008–2009 using two-level linear regression models. 
The results show that individuals reporting economic strain support redistribution more 
strongly than those who do not experience economic strain. Further, individuals living in 
countries where many other people report economic strain also support redistribution more 
strongly than individuals living in countries with less economic strain. The latter correlation is 
not explained by objective measures of the economic situation such as household income or 
the income dispersal of the country. The country-level effect of economic strain holds for all 
income levels. It is largely driven by a tendency to strongly believe in redistribution when 
living in countries of wide-spread economic strain. The results indicate that governments 
would receive more rather than less public support for redistributive policies during periods of 
economic strain.  
 
Introduction  
Most countries have some institutional arrangements for transferring income or wealth from 
rich to poor individuals or families. The most important arrangements are controlled by 
governments, including taxation of wealthier individuals and social expenditures benefiting 
poorer individuals and families. These policies are the subject of considerable political 
controversy, however, as they reflect two conflicting principles: that people should be allowed 
to live according to prevailing social standards (Marshall, 1964) versus that they should do 
what they can to be economically self-sufficient (Feldman and Zaller, 1992). Knowing in 
what kind of situations the public wants more redistribution is important because with no 
public demand policy makers are unlikely to enter the controversial issue of economic 
redistribution.  
Much empirical research has investigated what kind of individuals tend to support or 
not support economic redistribution (Taylor-Gooby, 1985), or in what kind of countries public 
opinion is more or less supportive toward redistribution (Svallfors, 1997). This paper 
introduces economic strain as a new explanation of public support toward redistribution. I 
hypothesise that economic strain affects public preferences for redistribution at the level of 
both individuals and countries. The individual-level effect means that individuals reporting 
economic strain are more likely to support redistribution than those not reporting economic 
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strain. The country-level effect means that as more people experience economic strain in a 
country even individuals not reporting economic strain tend to support redistribution.  
Compared to conventional explanations, economic strain is first of all an alternative to 
studying the effects of the economic situation of individuals and countries using objective 
economic measures such as household income and the income dispersal of the country (i.e. 
the Gini coefficient). I argue that economic strain is a theoretically simpler explanation of 
why people support redistribution than most objective measures of economic well-being. 
Empirically, I will show it is also a stronger predictor of public support toward redistribution 
than conventional economic explanations.  
These effects are investigated in twenty-eight countries in the fourth round of the 
European Social Survey (ESS) 2008–2009 using multi-level (random intercept) linear 
regression models. The analysis also investigates how far income levels and the income 
dispersal of the country can help explain why economic strain is associated with preferences 
for redistribution. I first present a review of conventional explanations of public support 
toward redistribution, before presenting the new perspective on how economic strain might 
affect public preferences for redistribution of income.  
 
Individual-level characteristics 
Who tends to support redistribution of income from rich to poor individuals? Much empirical 
research has investigated individual characteristics seen as indicators of the self-interest 
individuals have in relation to economic redistribution (Sears et al., 1980; Hasenfeld and 
Rafferty, 1989). The self-interest argument claims that those who are likely to gain from 
redistribution are more likely to support it, whereas those who are likely to contribute to the 
redistribution to others are more likely to oppose such policies. Empirical findings are 
consistent with this argument. For example, economically vulnerable individuals, as defined 
by low income and ethnic minority status (Hasenfeld and Rafferty, 1989) or by low 
occupational class and non-employment (Svallfors, 1997; Edlund, 1999), are more likely to 
support welfare provision associated with redistribution than less vulnerable groups. This is 
also the case when comparing public attitudes toward welfare policies in several countries 
(Svallfors, 1997; Edlund, 1999; Blekesaune and Quadagno, 2003).  
Correlations between income and support for redistribution are not very strong, 
however. Consequently, there is some debate over how far individual self-interest can explain 
variation in support for redistribution. One alternative explanation is that people may support 
redistribution if economic strain is supposedly caused by circumstances beyond individual 
control (Fong, 2001). This hypothesis is supported by psychological research finding a strong 
link between attributions of personal responsibility for people’s economic situation and 
support for redistribution (Appelbaum, 2001; Mitchell, 2003).  
 
Country-level characteristics 
Research has also investigated how far individuals living in different countries hold different 
preferences for economic redistribution (Svallfors, 1997; Dallinger, 2010) or social 
expenditure (Blekesaune and Quadagno, 2003). In these studies, country-level characteristics 
are often investigated as institutional characteristics of welfare policies (Svallfors, 1997; 
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Larsen, 2008) or as economic factors typically related to economic cycles (Blekesaune, 2007; 
Dallinger, 2010) or the income dispersal of the country (Lübcker, 2007; Finseraas, 2009).  
The institutional argument claims that institutional characteristics of welfare 
programmes shape public opinion (Svallfors, 1997; Larsen, 2008). Most research has 
investigated institutional characteristics rather crudely by grouping countries into a few types 
of welfare regimes (Svallfors, 1997; Edlund, 1999) à la Esping-Andersen (1990). More recent 
research has also utilised more direct policy measures, including social expenditures (Jæger, 
2006; Jakobsen, 2010) or more continuous scales measuring welfare regimes (Jæger, 2009). 
Comparative findings on welfare opinions only partially support the hypothesised consistency 
between public opinion and welfare policies (Jæger, 2009; Dallinger, 2010). Continuous 
variables could perhaps prove more promising than categorical classifications of welfare 
regimes (Jæger, 2009; Jakobsen, 2010) but might also create a risk that the large number of 
policy indicators made available by organisations such as Eurostat and OECD make it 
possible to construct measures supporting any hypothesis. Much of this research is based on 
strong theoretical assumptions: correlation between welfare regimes and public opinion 
reflects that policies affect public opinion, disregarding either the possibility that public 
opinion also affects welfare policies or the presence of a third variable (e.g. historical 
experience) affecting both policy makers and public opinion.  
 
Economic factors 
At least two types of economic factor have been investigated for how they affect public 
attitudes toward redistribution. One is economic cycles, typically measured as employment or 
unemployment rates (Blekesaune, 2007; Kim, 2007); the other is income dispersal, typically 
measured by the Gini coefficient (Finseraas, 2009; Lupu and Pontusson, 2011). The economic 
cycle argument was popular in the 1960s and 1970s when several authors claimed that public 
support for leftist policies (Leggett, 1964) or welfare provision and redistribution (Cutright, 
1965; Wilensky, 1975) tends to rise in “bad” periods of low employment or high 
unemployment rates. More recent empirical research is consistent with this argument, looking 
at temporal variation in employment rates (Blekesaune, 2007) or unemployment rates (Kim, 
2007) in several countries.  
The issue of income dispersal and public support for redistribution has attracted 
interest over recent years. Theoretically, much research has made use of the median voter 
theorem, stimulated by the Meltzer and Richard (1981) model. When median income is lower 
than average income – the situation in most countries – more income dispersal should lead to 
more public support for redistribution, certainly among middle-income citizens (Lübker, 
2007; Finseraas, 2009). In democratic societies it should also lead to more redistribution but 
this is of less interest here; this analysis focuses on the first part of the model.  
Empirical findings are not always consistent with this hypothesis. In aggregate data 
analyses, Kenworthy and McCall (2008) do not find this income dispersal effect when 
looking at trends in public support for redistribution in eight countries. Nor does Lübker 
(2007) find an income dispersal effect when comparing public support for redistribution in 26 
countries in the International Social Survey Program (ISSP) data. The latter study finds that 
public support for redistribution is correlated with popular assessments of the income 
dispersal of their country as being too large or not too small. Finseraas (2009) finds, on the 
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other hand, a positive correlation between income dispersal and public support for 
redistribution in the first round of the European Social Survey (ESS). Also, Lupu and 
Pontusson (2011) find a correlation between income dispersal and public support for 
redistribution among middle-income citizens (r=0.45) when comparing 90 country-level 
observations from various (ISSP and ESS) surveys.  
 
Economic strain  
The current analysis uses economic strain in place of other economic factors for predicting 
preferences for redistribution. Economic strain is measured subjectively, reflecting the extent 
to which people find it hard to live on their current income (Whelan et al., 2001; Berthoud et 
al., 2009). The terminology used in analyses of economic strain is not very consistent. 
Existing research uses all combinations of financial/economic and strain/stress/hardship. 
Various measures of economic strain are also used. Some authors use single items, typically 
indicated by living comfortably versus finding it hard to live on current income (Whelan et 
al., 2001); others use indices that may include additional items (Berthoud and Bryan, 2011).  
I hypothesise that economic strain makes individuals more supportive toward 
redistribution for two reasons: (1) such policies would improve their economic situation, and 
(2) individuals experiencing economic strain are more aware of economic problems than 
those not having such problems. Further, individuals living in countries where many people 
experience economic strain are also more likely to support redistribution, for similar reasons: 
(1) high incidence of economic strain makes individuals aware of the risk of economic strain, 
including those currently not experiencing such problems, and (2) this situation makes people 
aware of the problems of economic strain since there are more individuals around them 
experiencing such problems. At the country level there is also a third reason: (3) when more 
people experience economic strain, public opinion is more likely to see economic strain as an 
outcome of factors beyond individual control. In these situations, people tend to be more 
supportive toward redistribution, as indicated by empirical research (Appelbaum, 2001; Fong, 
2001; Mitchell, 2003) and normative theory (Rawls, 1972).  
Research on public opinion toward redistribution has largely investigated economic 
factors by objective characteristics (i.e. household income and income dispersal), and not as 
subjective assessments such as economic strain. Theoretical arguments, however, seemingly 
assume that low-income or large-income dispersal measured objectively affects people’s 
preferences for economic redistribution via some changes in people’s subjective assessment 
of their economic situation or the situation of their country. This follows from a standard self-
interest or rational choice model (Elster, 1989; Lübker, 2007). Economic strain can be seen as 
a more direct measure of how people assess their economic situation and would relate more 
directly to the underlying theoretical model compared to objective income measures.  
Economic strain does not necessarily correspond to situations of low income or where 
people are excluded from enjoying prevailing standards of living. Whelan and colleagues 
(2001) find that income, standards of living and subjective assessment – including economic 
strain – are not highly correlated. The research literature provides various arguments in favour 
of investigating some but not all of these factors. For example, people experiencing low-
income over short periods of a few years do not necessarily experience economic strain or 
reduce their standards of living (Berthoud and Bryan, 2011). Ringen (1988) argues that low 
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standards of living, and low assessments of these standards, are more direct measures of 
poverty than (current) income.  
Somewhat contrarily, economic strain does not only reflect low income but is also 
affected by how ambitious people are regarding consumption and abilities to convert income 
to goods and services. For example, older people tend to do better on low income than 
younger adults (Berthoud et al., 2009), and rising income levels in a society (economic 
growth) are not necessarily associated with less economic strain (Berthoud and Bryan, 2011).  
For these reasons, economic strain is controversial when used as an indicator of 
poverty. Social philosophers have argued that society should not support ambitious 
individuals with expensive tastes at the expense of others whose tastes are more modest 
(Rawls, 1972; Sen, 1992). The political implications might be different, however. For 
example, historians have argued that economic strain, rather than low income, fuelled the 
revolutions of Russia and Cuba (Carr, 1953; Zeitlin, 1966). Income poverty may not lead to 
demand for more redistribution or welfare provision, whereas economic strain might.  
 
Method  
The data analysed in this paper are from the fourth round of the European Social Survey 
2008–2009. All twenty-eight countries are investigated: Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czech 
Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Great Britain, Greece, Croatia, 
Hungary, Israel, Latvia, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russia, Slovakia, 
Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey and Ukraine. Sample sizes vary from 1,159 
(Cyprus) to 2,673 (Germany), with a mean of 1,898.  
The dependent variable, preferences for redistribution, is measured by a single item: 
“Using this card, please say to what extent you agree or disagree with each of the following 
statements [starting with]: The government should take measures to reduce differences in 
income levels.” The card has five responses varying from “Agree strongly” [value 5] to 
“Disagree strongly” [value 1] plus “Don’t know” [set to missing].  
The main explanatory variable, economic strain, is also measured by a single item: 
“Which of the descriptions on this card comes closest to how you feel about your household’s 
income nowadays?” The card has five responses varying from “Living comfortably on present 
income” [value 1] to “Finding it very difficult on present income” [value 4] plus “Don’t 
know” [set to missing].  
The data are investigated using linear regression models with random intercepts for the 
twenty-eight countries. The statistical analysis controls for gender (female dummy), age, 
being partnered (married or cohabiting dummy) or not and the number of children living in 
the household. Age is controlled for by three linear slopes (splines), and is divided by ten in 
order to make the coefficients larger in the tables, with the result that decimals reflect 
individual years. It is centred on 40 years (values in parentheses): 15–40 years (-2.5–0), 40–60 
years (0–2), and 60–99 years (0–3.9). All regression analyses are non-weighted.  
Sensitivity analysis is carried out by reclassifying the dependent variable: first by 
making it symmetrical, next by identifying two groups supporting economic redistribution 
(strongly or any kind of support) using binary logit models, and finally by limiting the 
analysis to the lower seven income deciles or the mid four income deciles, to test the median 
voter hypothesis.  
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A further analysis investigates how far the (individual- and country-level) effects of 
economic strain on public support for redistribution are explained by the income level of the 
household and the country (using mean household income of the country). Household income 
is measured by a pre-classified 10-level income group from the survey questionnaire corre-
sponding broadly to the deciles of the actual household income range of each country. This 
income variable is after tax income from all sources. Respondents can provide the answer in 
terms of weekly, monthly or annual income. Unfortunately, the household income variable is 
only available for 25 of the 28 countries (not Bulgaria, Cyprus or Slovakia), and only 81 per 
cent of the respondents of these 25 countries answer this question (lower in Southern Europe, 
only 42% per cent in Portugal), corresponding to 73 per cent of the full sample.    
A final analysis investigates whether the income dispersal of the country can help 
explain the correlation between economic strain and support for redistribution. Income 
dispersal is measured by the Gini coefficient taken from Eurostat’s EU-SILC database from 
2008 (2009 for some countries). Unfortunately, these data include only 23 of the 28 countries 
investigated (not Cyprus, Israel, Russia, Turkey or Ukraine). When combining household 
income and Gini coefficients in the same analysis, the number of countries drops to 21 and the 
number of individuals drops to 31,450 (59 per cent of the full sample).  
Descriptive statistics (Table 1) show that a majority of the respondents support 
redistribution, with a mean of 3.9 along the 1–5 scale. A minority report economic strain, with 
a (weighted) mean of 2.3 along the 1–4 scale. In the first analyses (Table 2) this variable is 
centred on its arithmetic (non-weighted) mean of 2.2, varying from -1.2 to 1.8 between 
respondents, and somewhat less between countries (-0.8–0.9), because of a cross-level 
interaction term of economic strain at the levels of individuals and countries.  
 
TABLE 1. Descriptive statistics of the variables (European Social Survey 2008/2009 using 
design and population weights.  
Variables 
#Countrie
s 
#Respondent
s Mean S.D. Low High 
Individual level:       
Redistribution 28 53133 3.9 1.0 1 5 
Economic strain 28 53133 2.3 0.9 1 4 
Econ.str.centred 28 53133 0.0 0.9 -1 2 
Female (d) 28 53133 53.4%  0 1 
Age 28 53133 45.5 18.1 15 99 
Partnered (d) 28 53133 61.7%  0 1 
#Children 28 53133 0.7 1.0 0 4 
Income decile 25 38770 5.3 2.8 1 10 
Country level:       
Mean (econ.str.) 28 53133 2.3 0.5 1.4 3.1 
Econ. str.-centr. 28 53133 0.1 0.5 -0.8 0.9 
Mean (income) 25 38770 5.0 0.8 3.4 7.5 
Gini coefficient 23 43233 30.7 3.1 23.4 37.7 
(d) = dummy variable, coded 1 and 0.  
 
Respondents are evenly distributed over the 10 income deciles, with slightly fewer on 
the lowest two income levels (mean 5.3). The number of children in the household is 
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delimited to four because of the small number of households with more than four children. 53 
per cent of the respondents are women and 62 per cent are partnered (using weighted data). 
Mean economic strain and mean household income of the countries, at the lower end of the 
table, are simple (non-adjusted, non-weighted) mean values calculated for each country in the 
sample. 
 
Results  
Regression results are presented in Table 2. Model 1 shows that individuals reporting 
economic strain are more likely to support redistribution than individuals not reporting 
economic strain. The predicted support for redistribution (1–5) increases with an average of 
0.187 for each unit increase in economic strain (roughly from -1 to 2). Further, individuals 
living in countries where many people report economic strain are also more likely to support 
redistribution than individuals living in countries where few people report economic strain. 
This is also the case when controlling for economic strain of the household. The predicted 
support for redistribution (1–5) increases with an average of 0.236 for each country-level 
mean increase in economic strain. Economic strain does vary more between individuals (or 
household) than between countries; standard deviation statistics are twice as large when 
comparing individuals (S.D=0.91) as they are in country comparisons (S.D.=0.46) (not shown 
in tables). Still, an increase in the mean economic strain of the country affects people’s 
preferences for redistribution as much or even more than a similar increase in economic strain 
of the household.   
 
TABLE 2. Two-level linear regression analysis of public support for redistribution
a
 as a result 
of individual-level (53,133) characteristics and mean economic strain of the country (28). 
Coefficients with standard errors in parentheses.  
 (1)  (2)  (3)  
Individual level:       
Female (1, 0) 0.098** (.008) 0.098** (.008) 0.055** (.006) 
Age (15–40)/10 0.006 (.009) 0.006 (.009) 0.025** (.007) 
Age (40–60)/10 0.094** (.008) 0.096** (.008) 0.064** (.006) 
Age (60–99)/10 -0.020* (.009) -0.019* (.009) -0.022** (.006) 
Partnered (1, 0) -0.017 (.010) -0.015 (.010) -0.010 (.007) 
#Children (1–4) 0.002 (.005) 0.002 (.005) -0.002 (.004) 
Economic strainb 0.187** (.005) 0.190** (.005) 0.138** (.004) 
Country level:       
Mean (econ. Str.)a 0.236* (.088) 0.234* (.086) 0.187** (.060) 
Cross level:       
Interact. (econ.str.)   -0.064** (.012) -0.036** (.009) 
Constant 3.782** (.043) 3.793** (.043) 3.989** (.030) 
S.D. countries 0.216 (.029) 0.211 (.029) 0.146 (.020) 
S.D. individuals 0.961 (.003) 0.961 (.003) 0.717 (.022) 
Rho (ICC) 0.048 (.012) 0.046 (.012) 0.040 (.010) 
Log likelihood -73354  -73339  -57673  
Notes: * significant at 5 per cent and ** significant at 1 per cent in two-sided tests, 
a
 1–5 in 
models 1 and 2, 3–5 in model 3, b 1–4 variable minus (mean of) 2.2. Age centred at 40 years.  
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Model 2 includes a cross-level interaction term between economic strain at the levels 
of individuals and countries. Figure 1 presents predictions for four combinations of this result 
as indicated by low and high economic strain at the levels of individuals and countries. The 
predictions are calculated at plus/minus 1.2 standard deviations (of the empirical distribution) 
of the two centred variables (from Table 1): plus/minus 1.09 (0.91*1.2) at the level of 
individuals and plus/minus 0.56 (0.46*1.2) at the level of countries.
1
 The graph shows that in 
countries of widespread economic strain, both individuals experiencing and not experiencing 
economic strain tend to support redistribution. In countries of less economic strain, only those 
experiencing economic strain tend to support redistribution.  
 
 
Figure 1. Combinations of individual and country-level economic strain in support for 
redistribution. Predictions from model 2, Table 2.  
 
Further results show that women are more supportive of redistribution than men, and 
people in their sixties are more supportive than those below 40. There are no differences 
between partnered and non-partnered individuals, or between those with and those without 
children in the household.  
The lower part of tables 2 and 3 splits the unexplained variation between individuals 
and countries. By comparing statistical models with and without various explanatory 
variables, it can be shown that only economic strain explains country-level variation in public 
support for redistribution; standard deviation statistics (S.D.) are reduced from 0.292 in a 
model with no explanatory variables to 0.211 in a model including only economic strain (not 
shown in tables). Further, the mean economic strain of the country explains more country-
level variation in public support for redistribution (down to 0.211) than the individual 
(compositional) effect in economic strain (down to 0.237) (not shown in tables). Taken 
together, both regression slopes and random variation indicate that economic strain at country 
level is important in shaping public attitudes toward redistribution, and it appears to be 
important for understanding country-level variation in public support for redistribution.  
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Sensitivity 
It is a potential problem with these cross-level interaction effects that they could result from a 
so-called ceiling effect. The dependent variable varies from 1 to 5 with a mean of nearly 4, 
meaning that very few people are against redistribution. Hence, the low variation in public 
support for redistribution in countries of widespread economic strain could simply reflect that 
the instrument measuring this support does not pick up much variation in public support for 
redistribution in poor countries. Model 3 (in Table 2) corrects for this potential bias by 
merging the three lowest values in public support for redistribution (1–3) into a single value 
(3), meaning that the dependent variable is symmetrical (similar numbers of 3 and 5). This 
model provides results nearly identical to those of model 2 when considering the smaller 
variation in the dependent variable (public support for redistribution) in model 3 compared to 
that in model 2. Hence, we can conclude that in countries where many people feel poor, even 
those who do not feel poor tend to support redistribution from rich to poor individuals. In 
wealthier countries, redistribution is subject to more controversy when comparing rich and 
poor individuals.  
The ESS questionnaire identifies two groups supporting redistribution of income: 
those agreeing strongly with redistribution and those reporting any kind of agreement with 
redistribution. The two outcomes can be investigated separately using binary logit models. 
Such analyses show largely similar results as those reported in Table 2 (results not shown in 
tables). The individual-level effect of economic strain is slightly stronger in the model of any 
kind of agreement with redistribution than when analysing those agreeing strongly with 
redistribution. The country-level effect of economic strain is, on the other hand, much 
stronger when analysing those agreeing strongly than when analysing those merely agreeing 
with redistribution, when this effect becomes marginally non-significant. The interaction 
effect between economic strain at the levels of individuals and countries is of similar 
magnitude in the two logit models.  
The median voter theorem suggests that the results presented here should hold for 
people with low and medium income but perhaps not for people with higher incomes. This 
hypothesis can be investigated by restricting the analysis to mid and low-income earners. 
Results remain similar, however, for the economic strain variables when restricting the 
analyses to the lower seven income deciles or to the mid four income deciles (analysis not 
shown here). The sole exception is that the individual-level (but not country-level) effect of 
economic strain is reduced slightly when omitting the highest two income deciles. Hence, 
these results cannot be interpreted into a simple rational choice model where support for 
redistribution occurs only where this is gainful to the individual respondent.  
 
Adding household income and income dispersal 
Table 3 investigates similar correlations (to Table 2) by including household income and 
country-level (mean household) income (model 1) or country-level income dispersal 
measured by the Gini coefficient (model 2) as explanatory variables. Since these analyses 
include fewer individuals (model 1 and 2) and countries (model 2) the correlations between 
economic strain and support for redistribution may also change (increase) as compared to the 
results in Table 2. 
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With no statistical control for economic strain, household income (1-10) predicts 
support for redistribution (1–5) which decreases with an average of 0.057 for each unit 
(decile) increase in income (not shown in tables). The similar (mean household) country-level 
income variable is similarly correlated (0.050) with public preferences for redistribution when 
disregarding the smaller variance in the country-level compared to the household-level 
income variable. This country-level correlation is far from statistically significant, however.  
When using both income and economic strain in the same model (1), we find that both 
household income and household-level economic strain strongly predict public support for 
redistribution. The two effects are of similar magnitude when considering the actual variation 
in the two explanatory variables or the test statistics associated with the two slopes. Still, there 
is a considerable amount of overlap (colinearity) between these effects; they are both lower 
than in models where only one of these effects is specified. At the country level there is no 
correlation between (mean household) income and public support for redistribution when also 
controlling for economic strain (the income coefficient switches sign in model 1). The slope 
between country-level economic strain and public support for redistribution gets even steeper 
(and more significant) when also controlling for the (mean household) income of the country.  
 
TABLE 3. Two-level linear regression analysis of public support for redistribution (1–5) as a 
result of individual-level characteristics and (mean) income level, income dispersal (Gini 
coefficients) and (mean) economic strain of the country. Coefficients with standard errors in 
parentheses.  
 (1)  (2)  
Individual level:     
Female (1, 0) 0.093** (.010) 0.108** (.011) 
Age (15–40)/10 0.004 (.011) -0.001 (.012) 
Age (40–60)/10 0.086** (.010) 0.092** (.011) 
Age (60–99)/10 -0.036* (.010) -0.053** (.011) 
Partnered (1, 0) 0.032** (.012) 0.056** (.013) 
#Children (1–4) 0.005 (.006) 0.004 (.007) 
H.h. income decile -0.037** (.002) -0.042** (.003) 
Econ.strain (1–4) 0.131** (.007) 0.148** (.008) 
Country level:     
Mean (h.h. income) 0.081 (.056)   
Gini coefficient   -0.007 (.016) 
Mean (ec.strain) 0.383** (.116) 0.404* (.158) 
Constant 2.423** (.491) 3.026** (.355) 
S.D. countries 0.212 (.030) 0.224 (.035) 
S.D. individuals 0.957 (.003) 0.963 (.004) 
Rho (ICC) 0.055 (.013) 0.051 (.015) 
Log likelihood -53371  -43499  
#Individuals 38,770  43,233  
#Countries 25  21  
Notes: * significant at 5 per cent and ** significant at 1 per cent in two-sided tests; 
†
 
significant at 5 per cent in one-sided tests. Age centred at 40 years.  
 
Model 2 is similar to model 1 but now the country-level mean household income 
variable is replaced by country-level income dispersal measured by the Gini coefficient. The 
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number of countries is also smaller, now reduced to 21, and the number of respondents drops 
to a mere 59 per cent of the full sample. The country-level Gini coefficient is correlated with 
public support for redistribution (not shown in tables), but this relationship is not strong and it 
is only statistically significant when using a one-sided test (which is appropriate in this case).  
When using both economic strain and the Gini coefficient in the same model (2), there 
is no correlation between the Gini coefficient and public support for redistribution when also 
controlling for (country-level) economic strain (the Gini coefficient switches sign in model 2). 
The slope between country-level economic strain and public support for redistribution gets 
even steeper when also controlling for the country’s income dispersal measured by the Gini 
coefficient.  
Most other results are similar when comparing Table 2 and 3. The main exception is 
that partnered individuals are more supportive toward redistribution than non-partnered 
individuals when also controlling for household income. 
 
Summary and discussion  
I have hypothesised that economic strain leads to stronger public support for redistribution, 
both among people experiencing economic strain and among people living in countries where 
many other people report economic strain. Data from the twenty-eight countries of the 
European Social Survey round four are consistent with this hypothesis. These results are 
robust across various income levels and various classifications of the dependent variable. The 
country-level effect is largely driven by a tendency to strongly agree with redistribution in 
countries of widespread economic strain.   
Survey data on public attitudes may reflect tendencies people have to select certain 
response categories (response style) or to present themselves in ways that do not represent 
their true attitudes (response set) (O’Neill, 1967). These tendencies are likely to become more 
important when comparing data from various countries because of different languages and 
cultures (Singh, 1995). There is thus a possibility that single items are correlated because of 
how respondents from different countries interpret their exact wordings. The wordings of the 
response categories for economic strain and support for redistribution are different, however, 
and the ordering of these categories in the questionnaire is such that any tendency to choose 
the first or the last category would lead to a negative correlation between economic strain and 
support for redistribution, the opposite of what is found here.  
The fact that individuals experiencing economic strain tend to support redistribution 
could be seen as self-evident since many of them would gain from such policies. This follows 
from a standard self-interest argument. It is more interesting that people not experiencing 
economic strain also tend to support redistribution from the rich to the poor when living in 
countries where many other people experience economic strain. This country-level effect of 
economic strain is as strong, or even stronger, than the individual/household-level effect of 
economic strain when disregarding the larger individual-level variation in the economic strain 
variable. This finding can be given various interpretations. The risk of running into economic 
problems is larger when many people are experiencing such problems. Further, the awareness 
of the problem of economic strain is larger when many people experience economic problems 
in a country, even among those without such problems. Finally, public opinion is more likely 
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to see economic strain as an outcome of factors beyond individual control when more people 
experience economic strain.  
The link between economic strain and public support for redistribution is likely to be 
important for policymakers. Popular theory suggests that people’s preferences for 
redistributive policies are rooted in more general value systems regarding the proper 
relationship between the individual and the state (Feldman and Zaller, 1992). The path 
dependency thesis could indicate that any policy change affecting economic distribution will 
generate more negative than positive feedback from the electorate (Pierson, 2000). This 
research indicates that the scope for redistributive policies is better in periods of economic 
strain than in periods of economic growth when regarding public support.  
Both low income and economic strain are important for understanding who is 
supporting redistribution at the level of individuals and households. People with low incomes 
are more likely to experience economic strain than higher-income individuals and families. 
Hence, the two explanations, low income and economic strain, overlap to some extent in 
explaining who is supporting redistribution of income. These findings make sense if we 
assume that low income leads to more economic strain and eventually to more support for 
redistribution. At the level of individuals and households, it appears that economic strain to 
some extent mediates the effect of low income in explaining who is supporting redistribution, 
and to some extent explains individual-level support for redistribution beyond what is 
explained by their current income.  
At the country level, both mean household income and income dispersal could perhaps 
help explain why some countries are more supportive toward redistribution than other 
countries. But neither of these effects is strong, and both disappear when controlling for mean 
economic strain of the country. Clearly, this subjective measure of economic problems is 
much more important for understanding country-level variation in public support for 
redistribution than the mean (household) income of the country, or the income dispersal of the 
country. At the level of countries it is unlikely that economic strain merely mediates the 
effects of objective economic conditions. It is more likely that economic strain drives public 
demand for redistribution, apparently across various levels of economic prosperity and 
income dispersal.  
Economic strain is important for understanding why some countries are more 
supportive toward redistribution than others. Previous research has largely explained country-
level variation in public support for redistribution by institutional factors (e.g. welfare 
regimes) or economic factors measured objectively (economic cycles, income dispersal). 
Economic strain has some advantages regarding simplicity of explanation (compared to 
income dispersal), simplicity of interpretation (compared to institutional arrangements) and 
empirical support (compared to other economic factors). Still, the relationship between 
economic strain and other factors affecting public support for redistribution should be 
investigated more thoroughly. For example, future research should include actual 
redistribution when investigating public preferences for redistribution. It should also look into 
more dynamic (longitudinal) aspects of the relationships between income, standards of living, 
economic strain and public support for redistribution.  
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Note  
1
 This range indicates high and low values while still including a large proportion of the 
sample. In a normally distributed variable, 77 per cent would be within and 23 per cent would 
be outside (11.5 per cent below and 11.5 per cent above) this range.  
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